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CHAPTER 10A
Free Movement of Goods in the EU
Armin Cuyvers
10.1 Goods: The Foundation of the EU Internal Market
When the EU internal market was established, goods accounted for more than 
70% of the European economy. Consequently, goods formed the primary focus 
when the Treaty rules on free movement were drafted, and most of the early 
internal market cases concerned goods as well. Many of the most fundamental 
and groundbreaking judgments on the internal market, therefore, were made 
in the context of goods. As a result, the free movement of goods forms a useful 
starting point for any analysis of EU free movement law.
This Chapter provides an overview of EU rules on the free movement of 
goods. In light of the comparative aim of this book, the focus will lie on the 
main rules and doctrines of negative integration, which were gradually devel-
oped in the early days of EU integration and still form the foundation of EU 
free movement law today. In this discussion, pride of place will go to the case 
law of the CJEU, which was instrumental in developing the rather vague and 
general provisions in the Treaties, and turning them into effective rights.1
The Treaty framework for the free movement of goods, laid down in Articles 
28–37 and Article 110 TFEU, distinguishes between financial and non-financial 
restrictions. Financial restrictions can either be customs duties or internal 
taxes that protect national products. Non-financial restrictions, on the other 
hand, are all national rules that impose quantitative limits on foreign goods 
or in any other way limit their access to the national market. The reason for 
removing both financial and non-financial restrictions is to allow goods to be 
traded freely throughout the entire territory of the EU, ensuring that, for exam-
ple, the French cannot use their tax laws to block German beer, or the Germans 
their product standards to bar French wine.
This Chapter discusses the EU rules on financial obstacles before moving 
on to the rules on non-financial restrictions. Before doing so, however, it is 
1   For more detailed discssions see inter alia P. Oliver (ed.), Oliver on Free Movement of Goods 
in the European Union (5th edn, Hart, 2010) or C. Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU. The 
Four Freedoms (4th edn., OUP 2013).
 327Free Movement Of Goods In The Eu
necessary to discuss some preliminary issues, including the concept of a good 
and the scope of the free movement of goods.
10.2 Goods Falling under EU Free Movement Law
The Treaties do not define ‘goods’, but the CJEU has defined them as: ‘products 
which can be valued in money and which are capable, as such, of forming the 
subject of commercial transactions.’2 This is a very broad definition that can 
even include electricity or waste that no longer has any commercial value.3 
Fishing rights, on the other hand, formed intangible rights that did not qualify 
as goods.4
The right to free movement applies to all goods that originate from a 
Member State or that that have been legally brought into free circulation 
somewhere in the EU.5 Once a good has been imported into one EU Member 
State, therefore, it can move just as freely as any good produced in the EU, 
without requiring any certificate of origin.6 Free movement rights only apply, 
however, in cross-border situations. A Czech car, built in the Czech Republic 
and sold in the Czech Republic, for example, has never crossed a border, and 
therefore does not fall under EU free movement law.7 However, a cross-border 
effect may already be present where a national rule ‘facilitates the marketing of 
goods of domestic origin to the detriment of imported goods’, even if the rule 
only applies to national products.8 In other words, even if a national rule does 
2   Case 7/68 Commission v. Italy [1968] ECR 617 and Case C-65/05 Commission v. Greece [2006]
ECR I-10341.
3   Case C-379/98 Preussen Elektra [2001] ECR I-2099 and Case C-2/90 Wallonian Waste [1992] 
ECR I-4431.
4   Case C-97/98 Jägerskiöld [1999]ECR I-7319.
5   See Article 29(2) TFEU and Case 2/69 Sociaal fonds voor de Diamantarbeiders [1969] ECR 211, 
paras. 24–26.
6   Case 41/76 Donckerwolcke [1976] ECR 1921, para. 17. To enter legally they have to comply with 
all rules in the EU Common Customs Code and pay the required duties. See Regulation 
450/2008 on the Modernised EU Common Customs Code, OJ [2008] L145/1.
7   Note though that the CJEU has sometimes also applied free movement prohibitions against 
measures that differntiated between regions within a Member State. This apporach might 
be of particulr interest in the EAC, where some barriers may lie within Member States, for 
example in Tanzania. See for example Case C-363/93, Lancry [1994] ECR I-3957, par. 26 or 
Case C-72/03 Carbonati Apuani ECLI:EU:C:2004:506, par. 22.
8   Case C-321/94, Pistre, [1997] ECR I-2343.
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not even apply to foreign products but grants a benefit to national products, a 
cross-border effect is present and EU law applies.
When they apply, the rules on the free movement of goods have direct 
effect. This means that they can be directly relied on before national courts or 
other public bodies to challenge any national rule or practise that restricts free 
movement.9 Consequently, individuals and businesses do not have to wait for 
public enforcement against restrictions, but can directly attack them them-
selves on the basis of EU law.10 So far, the Treaty provisions on goods, do not 
yet seem to have horizontal direct effect, even though they can be relied upon 
against private bodies that wield certain public authority.11
10.3 Financial Restrictions
The first category of prohibited restrictions concern financial restrictions, 
which can either be customs duties and charges having an equivalent effect 
(Article 30 TFEU), or internal taxation measures restricting free movement 
(Article 110 TFEU).
10.3.1 Customs Duties and Charges Having an Equivalent Effect
Customs duties include any form of payment that has to be made because a 
good crosses a border, also of a fiscal nature. All customs duties are prohibited 
under Article 30 TFEU, without exception. In practice, customs duties no lon-
ger occur in the EU, which attests to the effectiveness of this prohibition.
Article 30 TFEU, however, also prohibits ‘charges having an equivalent effect 
to customs duties’. This means that Member States are not allowed to adopt 
other measures that are technically speaking not a customs duty, but in prac-
tice have the same effect. Consider, for example, Portugal imposing an obliga-
tory veterinary check at the border and charging a mandatory fee of 10 euros 
per animal. Such a measure would not be a customs duty, but would have the 
same effect of increasing the price of imported live stock.
9    The CJEU has even held that a statement by a public official can be a prohibited restriction 
under Article 34 TFEU. See Case C-470/03, A.G.M.-COS.MET [2007] ECR I-2749, par. 58.
10   See EU chapter 4 on the concept of direct effect and supremacy of EU law. For the direct 
effect of the free movement of goods provisions see inter alia Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos 
[1963] ECR 1, and Case 74/76, Iannelli [1977] ECR 577.
11   See for example Case 311/85 Vereniging voor Vlaamse reisbureaus [1987] ECR 3801, paras. 11 
and 30, and recently Case C-171/11, Fra.bo ECLI:EU:C:2012:453.
 329Free Movement Of Goods In The Eu
To make sure Member States do not develop creative alternative measures 
to circumvent the prohibition of Article 30 TFEU, the CJEU has given a very 
broad and effect-based interpretation to the concept of ‘charges having an 
equivalent effect’, which covers:
any pecuniary charge, however small and whatever its designation and 
mode of application, which is imposed unilaterally on domestic or for-
eign goods by reason of the fact that they cross a frontier, and which is 
not a customs duty in the strict sense.12
All charges having an equivalent effect are in principle prohibited, as the Treaty 
provides no possible justifications for them.13 The CJEU, however, has allowed 
two very narrow exceptions. Firstly, a charge may be allowed where it covers 
the actual costs of an inspection required by EU law itself. Where the EU, for 
example as during the BSE crisis, imposes mandatory health inspections on 
beef at the border, Member States may recover the costs of these inspections 
from importers. The charges imposed, however, may never exceed the actual 
costs of the inspections.14
Secondly, charges are allowed where they only form compensation for ser-
vices rendered to the importer on a voluntary basis. For example, an importer 
may voluntarily request to use a warehouse with cooling facilities owned by the 
state whilst awaiting further shipping of the goods. If so, the state may charge 
a reasonable fee for this service.15 As soon as there is any form of obligation, 
directly or indirectly, to make use of a specific service, however, or if there is no 
real benefit to the individual importer, no charges may be imposed.16
10.3.2 Internal Taxation as a Restriction on Free Movement of Goods
Member States are also not allowed to effectively recreate customs duties via 
their internal taxes. Just imagine France imposing an additional VAT of 20% on 
German cars, which would undo the prohibition of Article 30 TFEU completely. 
12   Case 24/68 Commission v Italy [1969] ECR 193, par. 9. This remains the case ‘even if the 
charge is not imposed for the benefit of the State, is not discriminatory or protective in 
effect and if the product on which the charge is imposed is not in competition with any 
domestic product.’ See Joined Cases 2/62 and 3/62, Commission v Belgium and Luxemburg 
ECLI:EU:C:1962:45.
13   Case 24/68 Commission v Italy, par 10.
14   Case 18/87 Commission v Germany, ECLI:EU:C:1988:453.
15   Case 132/82 Commission v Belgium, ECLI:EU:C:1983:135, par. 8.
16   See for the strict scrutiny of the CJEU on this point for example Ford España v Spain 
ECLI:EU:C:1989:306, or Case 87/75 Bresciani [1976] ECR 129.
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Therefore, even though Member States retain the competence to organize 
their own tax system, they may not use their taxes to restrict free movement 
of goods.17 For ‘whenever a fiscal levy is likely to discourage imports of goods 
originating in other Member States to the benefit of domestic production’, it is 
caught by the prohibition of Article 110 TFEU.18
To protect free movement, Article 110 TFEU prohibits both discriminatory 
taxation and more subtle measures that do not discriminate but still have the 
effect of protecting national products. Discriminatory taxes are prohibited in 
Article 110(1) TFEU, which determines that ‘No Member State shall impose, 
directly or indirectly, on the products of other Member States any internal 
taxation of any kind in excess of that imposed directly or indirectly on similar 
domestic products.’
For Article 110(1) TFEU to apply, one must first assess if a tax is imposed on 
‘similar’ products. Here the CJEU primarily looks at the comparability of prod-
ucts from the perspective of the consumer. As the CJEU held in Commission 
v France, similarity must be assessed on the basis ‘not of the criterion of the 
strictly identical nature of the products but on that of their similar and compa-
rable use.’19 This may lead the CJEU into rather factual assessments involving 
substances as fruit wine, whiskey or that evergreen of EU law, bananas.20
If products are sufficiently similar, one must next assess if the tax at issue 
discriminates between them, either directly or indirectly. Direct discrimina-
tion means that imported products are taxed differently precisely because they 
originate from another Member State. Indirect discrimination, which is more 
common, means that taxation differs based on a criterion that seems neutral as 
to nationality, but in reality affects imported goods more than national goods. 
The case of Humblot provides a good example of indirect discrimination, and 
how Member States may use it to protect their own industries.21 In Humblot, 
the French tax on cars with more than a 16 cylinder engine volume rose sharply 
from 1.100 French francs to 5000 francs. It just so happened that no car pro-
duced in France had a cylinder engine volume over 16, but many German cars 
did. The French tax measure, therefore, did not directly discriminate based on 
nationality, but the criterion of engine volume indirectly discriminated against 
17   See inter alia Case 168/78 Commission v France [1980] ECR 347.
18   Case 252/86 Bergandi ECLI:EU:C:1988:112, par. 25.
19   Case 168/78 Commission v France [1980] ECR 347. See also already Case 45/75 Rewe-Zentral 
[1976] ECR 181.
20   Cf. Case 243/84 Johnnie Walker [1986] ECR 875 and Case 184/85 Commission v Italy [1987] 
ECR 2013.
21   Case C-112/84 Humblot, ECLI:EU:C:1985:185.
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imported cars. The CJEU saw through this attempt to indirectly protect French 
car producers and found the measure to violate Article 110(1) TFEU.22
Article 110(2) TFEU may come in play where the products concerned are 
not similar, but the taxes nevertheless provide indirect protection to domestic 
products against competing importing products.23 For a tax to be caught by 
Article 110(2) two conditions must be met. First, the relevant products must 
be in a competitive relationship. This logically is a lower threshold than the 
similarity that is required for Article 110(1) TFEU to apply.24 A competitive rela-
tionship essentially concerns substitutability, i.e. the question if consumers 
might choose product A instead of product B, for example if A becomes 5% 
cheaper. The classic example of products that are not comparable but do com-
pete is beer and (cheap) wine. In Commission v. UK, the tax imposed on wine 
was more than four times higher than the tax on beer, especially in the case 
of the lower segments of wine.25 As in Humblot, it just so happens that the UK 
produces almost no wine, but does produce a lot of beer. Ultimately, the CJEU 
held that wine and beer were not similar enough to fall under Article 110(1) 
TFEU, but they were substitutable enough for consumers to be in competi-
tion with each other in the meaning of Article 110(2) TFEU, as consumers can 
switch from beer to wine.
Second, if products compete with each other, the tax may not protect the 
domestic product. Here the CJEU primarily looks at the effect of the tax on 
consumers. In Commission v. UK, for example, the CJEU found that the much 
higher taxes on wine did protect the domestic beer, and hence was prohib-
ited under Article 110(2) TFEU, because the tax difference was so high that 
it affected consumer choices and the tax difference could not be objectively 
justified on any ground. Member States, therefore, do of course retain the 
freedom to differentiate their taxes on different products based on objective 
criteria. For Article 110(2) TFEU to apply, therefore, a real protective effect must 
be shown, the mere existence of a difference in tax rate is not enough.26
22   For another example, see Case C-402/09, Tatu ECLI:EU:C:2011:219. Directly discriminatory 
taes can never be justified. Whether indirectly discriminory taxes can ever be justified, 
even though the Traety provides no exceptions, remains a contested question. See for 
a case that perhaps provides an opening Case 140/79 Chemial Farmaceutici v DAF [1981] 
ECR 1.
23   On the difficculties that may arise in distinguishing between 110(1) and 110(2) TFEU see 
for example Case 169/78 Commission v Italy [1980] ECR 385 or Case 171/78 Commission v 
Denmark [1980] ECR 447.
24   Case 27/67 Fink-Frucht [1968] ECR 223.
25   Case 170/78 Commission v UK [1983] ECR 2265.
26   Cf. on the leeway of Member States also Case 243/84 Johnnie Walker [1986] ECR 875.
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Article 30 and 110 TFEU jointly aim to prevent financial obstacles to free 
movement, The two provisions are mutually exclusive. A case, therefore, can 
never fall under both provisions. A financial charge is either based on the prod-
uct crossing the border, and hence a customs duty under Article 30 TFEU, or 
not, in which case it falls under Article 110 TFEU. For example, if an identical 
charge is levied from both imported and domestic products, this forms an 
internal tax, even if the tax for imported products just happens to be collected 
at the border.27 For in such situations, the charge itself does not depend on the 
crossing of the border, only the time and place of collection does.
10.4 Non-Financial or Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs)
As the EAC experience has also shown, real free movement of goods cannot be 
achieved by just removing financial or tariff barriers.28 For in practice, trade in 
goods is obstructed at least as much by so called non-tariff barriers (NTBs) as 
it is by tariff barriers. For example, consider a producer of child-safety seats in 
a situation where each Member State has different safety standards for child-
safety seats. Even if there are no tariffs and equivalent charges, he will still find 
it difficult to sell his child-safety seats in other Member States. Not only will he 
have to meet different standards in all Member States, the national producers 
he competes with only have to meet their own national safety standards, giv-
ing them a competitive advantage. Previous experiences have clearly shown, 
therefore, that NTBs create major obstacles to trade. A lesson, in reality, the UK 
will have to relearn the hard way if it chooses to fall back on WTO rules after 
Brexit, as these rules do not deal with NTBs.29
In the EU, non-tariff barriers are prohibited under articles 34 and 35 TFEU, 
unless they can be justified under Article 36 TFEU or a rule of reason excep-
tion. The next paragraphs will first set out how the CJEU developed these two 
27   Case C-221/06 Stadtgemeinde Frohnleiten [2007] ECR I-9643, Case 29/87 Denkavit [1988] 
ECR 2965 or Joined Cases 441–442/98 Mikhailidis [2000] ECR I-7145. Of course difficulties 
may arise in practise to dinstinguish, but a choice must then be made. See for example 
Case 105/75 Interzuccheri [1977] ECR 1029 or Case C-28/96 Fricarnes [1997] ECR I-4939.
28   See also chapter 10 par. 4.on NTBs in the EAC.
29   Cf also S. Dhingra en T. Sampson, ‘Life after Brexit: What are the UK’s options outside 
the European Union?’ Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics 
Working PaperBrexit 01, HM Government, ‘Alternatives to membership: possible models 
for the United Kingdom outside the European Union’ March 2016, available at <https://
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/504604/
Alternatives_to_membership_-_possible_models_for_the_UK_outside_the_EU.pdf>.
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provisions into very broad prohibitions that are capable of capturing almost 
any national rule. Subsequently, they describe the exceptions EU law provides 
to Member States to defend NTBs that serve a public interest, and the way the 
CJEU balances restrictions to free movement and such public interests.
10.4.1 The Prohibition on Quantitative Restrictions and Measures Having 
Equivalent Effect
Article 34 TFEU forms the key prohibition behind the free movement of goods 
in the EU. It provides that:
Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent 
effect shall be prohibited between Member States.30
The concept of a ‘quantitative restriction’ thereby refers to measures that 
directly concern the quantity or the number of products that may be imported 
or exported.31 This, of course, includes a total ban, that allows zero products 
to be imported or exported,32 but also partial restrictions that allow only a 
certain number of products to be imported.33 Like customs duties, however, 
quantitative restrictions are relatively rare in the EU. The main prohibition in 
Article 34 TFEU, therefore, concerns ‘measures having an equivalent effect to 
quantitative restrictions’ or MEQRs.
As MEQR is a rather vague concept, it was once again up to the CJEU to pro-
vide a definition. One route the CJEU could take, in line with Article 18 TFEU, 
was to interpret this concept narrowly as a prohibition on national measures 
that discriminated against imported goods. In Dassonville, its seminal judg-
ment on the free movement of goods, however, the CJEU took a very different 
approach and provided a very wide definition of MEQRs as:
All trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable of 
hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community 
trade (. . .)34
30   Article 35 TFEU contains an almost identical prohibition for the, less common, restric-
tions on export, and wil not be discussed separately here.
31   Case 2/73, Geddo [1973] ECR 865.
32   Case 34/79, R Henn and Darby, [1979] ECR 3795.
33   See for example Case 13/68, Salgoil [1968] ECR 453 or Case 170/04, Rosengren [2007] ECR 
I-4701.
34   Case 8/74, Dassonville, [1974], ECR 837.
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Under this definition, even measures that are capable of potentially hinder-
ing trade in an indirect fashion qualify as measures of equivalent effect, and 
hence are in principle prohibited under Article 34 TFEU. Crucially, the CJEU 
also did not require any form of (indirect) discrimination to be present, but 
only looked at the actual or possible effect of a measure on trade.
The broad Dassonville definition of MEQR was further developed in Cassis 
de Dijon, another seminal judgment on the free movement of goods. In this 
case, the applicant wanted to import the liqueur ‘Cassis de Dijon’ into Germany 
from France. Under an interesting German approach to consumer protection, 
however, the liqueur did not contain enough alcohol. German law required 
that liqueurs such as Cassis de Dijon had an alcohol content of at least 25%, 
whereas the French liqueur only contained 15–20% alcohol. The German 
authority, therefore, refused to allow the importation. The applicant claimed 
this constituted a prohibited MEQR. Germany contended, however, that the 
measure did not discriminate in any way as it applied equally to German and 
French drinks, and therefore also did not violate Article 34 TFEU. The CJEU was 
not convinced:
In practice, the principal effect of requirements of this nature is to pro-
mote alcoholic beverages having a high alcohol content by excluding 
from the national market products of other Member States which do not 
answer that description
It therefore appears that the unilateral requirement imposed by the 
rule of Member State of a minimum alcohol content for the purposes of 
the sale of alcoholic beverages constitutes an obstacle to trade which is 
incompatible with the provisions of Article [34] of the treaty.35
Even measures that in no way distinguish between national and foreign prod-
ucts, therefore, qualify as MEQRs if they in any way hinder foreign goods that 
want to enter the national market.
Cassis de Dijon also introduced another far reaching doctrine that continued 
to play an important role in EU free movement law: the principle of mutual 
recognition.36 In principle, Member States should trust each other’s regula-
tions to be sufficient and adequate, and therefore recognize and allow prod-
ucts that have been legally produced according to the standards of another 
35   Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentrale AG v. Bundesmonopolverwalting für Branntwein (Cassis de 
Dijon) [1979], ECR 649.
36   See for the importance of this principle for free movement and its role in newer forms of 
harmonization EU Chapter 9.
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Member State. In the case of Cassis de Dijon, the fact that the liqueur complied 
with French legislation should in principle suffice for the German authorities, 
unless they could prove why in this particular case French products should not 
be trusted.
It is difficult to exaggerate just how broad the definition of an MEQR under 
Dassonville and Cassis de Dijon is. The definition only requires that a national 
rule in some way makes it more difficult for a product to enter the market, 
not that the rule is harder on foreign products or imposes a dual burden.37 In 
practice, however, almost any rule that is worth having will require something, 
and therefore make it more difficult to enter the market than if the rule did 
not exist. For example, any product standard such as requiring real cocoa in 
chocolate or prohibiting certain additives in baby milk will make it more dif-
ficult for foreign producers to enter the market than if these standards did not 
apply. All such national standards, therefore, qualify as MEQRs under Article 
34 TFEU. In addition, the CJEU has also held that Member States have a positive 
obligation to prevent or stop any behaviour by private individuals that might 
interfere with the free movement of goods. In Spanish Strawberries, for exam-
ple, the French government was found to have violated Article 34 TFEU by not 
stopping French farmers from attacking and destroying trucks with Spanish 
fruit that was outcompeting French fruit.38 Such a general positive obligation 
to actively remove any restrictions to free movement caused by private indi-
viduals could also be a far reaching instrument in the EAC context.
Now as we will see, EU law does not just set aside such eminently desirable 
rules as health standards for baby milk, as these may often be justified.39 The 
only point here is that the very broad definition developed by the Court does 
qualify all such rules as MEQRs (or NTBs) and therefore brings them under the 
scope of the prohibition in Article 34 TFEU, and under the scrutiny of EU and 
national courts.
The benefit of this very broad definition was that it covered all potential 
NTBs, and removed any space that Member States might have to develop cre-
ative NTBs that do protect national products fall outside a narrower definition. 
The main downside of this definition, however, was that almost all national 
37   The MEQR, moreover, may even consist if some practises or factual behaviour of pub-
lic officials. In one extreme case, even a negative statement by a government official on 
Italian car lifts was found to constitute an MEQR under Article 34 TFEU. See Case C-470/03 
AGM-COS.MET [2007] ECR I-2749.
38   Case C-265/95 Commission / France (Spanish Strawberries) [1997] ECR I-6959. See also 
Case C-112/00 Schmidberger [2003] ECR I-5659.
39   See paragraph 10.5 below.
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rules now qualified as MEQRs and could therefore be challenged on the basis of 
EU law. After Dassonville and Cassis de Dijon, therefore, national courts and the 
CJEU were increasingly flooded with cases. Many of these challenged national 
rules that did technically qualify as MEQRs, but in reality were not concerned 
with restricting the free movements of goods. Symbolic in this regard became 
the Sunday Trading cases in which traders challenged national rules requiring 
shops to close on Sunday. As this meant traders could not sell their products 
on a Sunday, this indeed restricted their access to the market, but it was not the 
kind of restriction Article 34 TFEU was intended to capture.40
Consequently, the search was on for a way to limit the definition of an MEQR 
in a way that would prevent abuse of Article 34 TFEU but would not under-
mine the effectiveness of Article 34 TFEU in targeting real MEQRs. In the end, 
the CJEU opted for a less than convincing approach. In Keck, another landmark 
judgment, it introduced a problematic distinction between product norms and 
selling arrangements, holding that under certain conditions selling arrange-
ments do not fall under the scope of Article 34 TFEU.41
Keck concerned two traders, Keck and Mithouard, which were being pros-
ecuted in France for reselling goods at a loss, something that was prohibited 
under French law. The law, however, only prohibited resellers from doing so, as 
manufacturers were allowed to sell at a loss. Keck and Mithouard claimed this 
French rule violated, amongst other things, Article 34 TFEU. Considering its 
importance, and because it gives a good insight into the reasoning of the Court 
at this stage of the internal market development, the relevant paragraphs of 
the judgement are reproduced below:
By virtue of Article [34], quantitative restrictions on imports and all mea-
sures having equivalent effect are prohibited between Member States. 
The Court has consistently held that any measure which is capable of 
directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, hindering intra-Community 
trade constitutes a measure having equivalent effect to a quantitative 
restriction.
40   Case C-145/88 Torfaen Borough [1989] ECR I-3851 and Case C-169/91 B & Q [2002] ECR 
I-6635. See for a critical discussion for example A. Arnull, ‘What Shall We Do on Sunday?’, 
26 European Law Review (1991), 112 or J. Steiner, ‘Drawing the Line: Uses and Abuses of 
Article 30 EEC’, 29 Common Market Law Review (1992), 749.
41   Case C-276/91, Keck and Mithouard, [1993], ECR 6097.
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National legislation imposing a general prohibition on resale at a loss 
is not designed to regulate trade in goods between Member States.
Such legislation may, admittedly, restrict the volume of sales, and 
hence the volume of sales of products from other Member States, in so 
far as it deprives traders of a method of sales promotion. But the question 
remains whether such a possibility is sufficient to characterize the legis-
lation in question as a measure having equivalent effect to a quantitative 
restriction on imports.
In view of the increasing tendency of traders to invoke Article [34] 
of the Treaty as a means of challenging any rules whose effect is to limit 
their commercial freedom even where such rules are not aimed at prod-
ucts from other Member States, the Court considers it necessary to re-
examine and clarify its case-law on this matter.
It is established by the case-law beginning with “Cassis de Dijon” that, 
in the absence of harmonization of legislation, obstacles to free move-
ment of goods which are the consequence of applying, to goods com-
ing from other Member States where they are lawfully manufactured 
and marketed, rules that lay down requirements to be met by such goods 
(such as those relating to designation, form, size, weight, composition, 
presentation, labelling, packaging) constitute measures of equivalent 
effect prohibited by Article [34]. This is so even if those rules apply with-
out distinction to all products unless their application can be justified by 
a public-interest objective taking precedence over the free movement of 
goods.
By contrast, contrary to what has previously been decided, the appli-
cation to products from other Member States of national provisions 
restricting or prohibiting certain selling arrangements is not such as 
to hinder directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, trade between 
Member States within the meaning of the Dassonville judgment, so long 
as those provisions apply to all relevant traders operating within the 
national territory and so long as they affect in the same manner, in law 
and in fact, the marketing of domestic products and of those from other 
Member States.
Provided that those conditions are fulfilled, the application of such 
rules to the sale of products from another Member State meeting the 
requirements laid down by that State is not by nature such as to prevent 
their access to the market or to impede access any more than it impedes 
the access of domestic products. Such rules therefore fall outside the 
scope of Article [34] of the Treaty.
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Accordingly, the reply to be given to the national court is that Article 
30 of the EEC Treaty is to be interpreted as not applying to legislation of a 
Member State imposing a general prohibition on resale at a loss.42
The CJEU therefore proceeded to create a new category of regulations con-
cerning ‘selling arrangements’. Provided such selling arrangements 1) apply to 
all relevant traders operating within the national territory, and 2) affect the 
marketing of domestic products and of those from other Member States in 
the same manner, both in law and in fact, they do not constitute MEQRs under 
Article 34 TFEU and hence are not prohibited.43 The concept of selling arrange-
ments, however, was not really defined, but it includes those rules dealing with 
how a product is sold, rather than rules on how the product itself is made.44
Keck indeed reduced the scope of Article 34 TFEU, even if it did so in a rather 
construed and complicated way that has kept lawyers engaged for the past 
25 years. One of the opportunities for EAC law, therefore might be to find a 
better way to delineate the scope of the EAC free movement clauses, even 
though the more urgent challenge might be to make the prohibitions them-
selves more coherent and effective first.45
One of the questions Keck left open concerned the qualification of rules 
that do not regulate the product itself or the way it is sold, but rather the way a 
product may be used in a Member State. A rule that caps the maximum speed 
on the highway to a 100 kilometres per hour, for example, does not regulate 
how a car must be made or how it must be sold. It may affect, however, the 
42   Keck, paras. 11–18.
43   One important application of this requirement concerns the internet. The CJEU has held 
that restricting sales via the internet will always affect the marketing of foreign prodcuts 
more negatively since the on-line sales are usually the only channel available to sell for-
eign products, whereas domestic products usually also have other outlets such as physicial 
shops. This application of the earlier De Agostini case law seriously curtails the applica-
tion of Keck to the on-line market. See Case C-108/09 Ker-Optika ECLI:EU:C:2010:725 and 
Joined Cases C-34/95, C-35/95 and C-36/95, De Agostini ECLI:EU:C:1997:344.
44   The CJEU only provided a negative definition by indicating that measures that do not 
form selling arrangement would, inter alia, be those relating to designation, form, size, 
weight, composition, presentation, labelling and packaging.
45   In this context also see the complex case law of the CJEU on when the effect of a national 
measure on trade is too uncertain and indirect for the measure to qualifiy as a MEQR. 
Although not amounting to a real de minimis rule, this case law further limits the scope of 
Article 34 TFEU, although it is difficult to apply and predict in practise. See inter alia Case 
C-379/92, Peralta ECLI:EU:C:1994:296, Case 155/80 Oebel, [1981] ECR I-1993 as well as the 
Opinion of AG Kokott in Case C-142/05, Mickelsson and Roos ECLI:EU:C:2009:336.
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market access of cars. An expensive hyper-car, for example, may become less 
attractive if you can never really put it to use.
In more recent case law, the CJEU has now confirmed that such rules on use 
do form MEQRs, and therefore fall under the scope of Article 34 TFEU. One 
such case concerned the Italian prohibition to use a trailer behind a motorcy-
cle.46 This rule affected the sale of trailers for motorcycles, as it prohibited their 
use, even though it did not regulate the product as such. The CJEU held that in 
addition to product rules, Article 34 TFEU also covers ‘any other measure which 
hinders access of products originating in other Member States to the market of a 
Member State.’47 This more recent case law, therefore, again widens the scope 
of Article 34 TFEU, and restricts the Keck exception to selling arrangements in 
the stricter sense.
10.5 Justifying MEQRs
Precisely because Article 34 TFEU captures so many national rules, the ques-
tion of justification becomes essential. For without a proper doctrine of justifi-
cation, the EU would run the risk of setting aside a great deal of very welcome 
national rules that for example protect public health, public security or the 
environment. The last part of this Chapter, therefore, briefly discusses the ques-
tion of justification: how can a Member State justify a restriction on the free 
movement of goods? As the question of justification is often highly context 
dependent, and as a tremendous wealth of case law exists, this part focuses 
on the structure and main characteristics of the test used to see if national 
measures are justified, as understanding this test allows one to independently 
analyse specific cases on justification.
Restrictions on free movement may be justified if they 1) serve a legitimate 
aim, 2) in a proportionate manner.48 There are two types of legitimate aims, 
46   Case C-110/05, Commission v Italy ECLI:EU:C:2009:66. For another example see Case 
C-142/05, Mickelsson and Roos ECLI:EU:C:2009:336 on the use of jet skis.
47   Case C-110/05, Commission v Italy, ECLI:EU:C:2009:66 par. 37. See for further analysis 
P. Oliver, ‘Of Trailers and Jetskis: Is the Case Law on Article 34 TFEU Hurtling in a new 
Direction?’, 33 Fordham International Law Journal (2009–2010), 1423, or L. Gormley, ‘Free 
Movement of Goods and their Use—What Is the Use of It?’, 33 Fordham International Law 
Journal (2011), 1589–1628.
48   Also note that under the Tedeschi principle discussed in EU Chatper 9, Member States 
may only rely on justifications if the relevant area of law has not yet been harmonized. 
The moment that secondary EU law has been adopted, for instance on the safety of baby 
milk, that field is governed by the secondary legislation and no longer by the Treaty 
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namely Treaty based aims and the judge made aims under the rule of reason. 
Measures are proportionate, moreover, if they are suitable and necessary in rela-
tion to the legitimate aim they pursue. When applying any of these concepts, 
furthermore, it should be realized that in general all exceptions to free move-
ment are construed narrowly by the CJEU, and that the Court usually is very 
strict in applying them.49 Justifying a restriction, therefore, usually requires 
a convincing argument from the Member States, particularly demonstrating 
that the same objective could not have been reached by less restrictive means.
10.5.1 Treaty Aims and the Rule of Reaon
Article 36 TFEU provides that:
The provisions of Articles 34 and 35 shall not preclude prohibitions or 
restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of 
public morality, public policy or public security; the protection of health 
and life of humans, animals or plants; the protection of national treasures 
possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value; or the protection of 
industrial and commercial property. Such prohibitions or restrictions 
shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a 
disguised restriction on trade between Member States.
The grounds enumerated in Article 36 TFEU, however, are limitative and inter-
preted very strictly by the CJEU.50 Article 36 TFEU, therefore only provides very 
limited grounds to Member States to justify national measures, which became 
increasingly problematic after the very broad interpretation given to MEQRs 
by the CJEU. For where traders could now attack almost any national rule, 
Member States were severely restricted in their defences. For example, Article 
36 TFEU does not even mention consumer protection or the environment, 
meaning Member States cannot justify any measures based on these clearly 
desirable and reasonable objectives under the Treaty.
provisions on free movement. See for example Case C-309/02, Radlberger v Land Baden-
Württemberg, [2004] ECR I-11763, Case C-265/06, Commission v Portugal, [2008] ECR 
I-2245 or Case 193/80, Commission v Italy, [1981] ECR 3019. For the basis principle see Case 
5/77, Tedeschi [1977] ECR 1555.
49   See already Case 7/61, Commission v Italy, [1961] ECR 317 as well as Case 72/83, Campus Oil 
ECLI:EU:C:1984:256.
50   See amongst many others Case 288/83, Commission v Ireland, [1985] ECR 1761, Case 
C-265/95, Commission v France, [1997] ECR I-695 or Case 121/85, Conegate [1986] ECR 1007.
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In the same Cassis de Dijon judgment that confirmed Dassonville and intro-
duced mutual recognition, The CJEU recognized this problem and recognized 
a second, non-Treaty based category of justificatory grounds that Member 
States could rely on. This category of mandatory requirements has become 
known as the rule of reason exceptions:
In the absence of common rules relating to the production and mar-
keting of alcohol (. . .) it is for the Member States to regulate all matters 
relating to the production and marketing of alcohol and alcoholic bever-
ages on their own territory.
Obstacles to movement within the community resulting from dispari-
ties between the national laws relating to the marketing of the products 
in question must be accepted in so far as those provisions may be rec-
ognized as being necessary in order to satisfy mandatory requirements 
relating in particular to the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the pro-
tection of public health, the fairness of commercial transactions and the 
defence of the consumer.51
The Court gives the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the protection of public 
health, the fairness of commercial transactions and the defence of the con-
sumer as examples of mandatory requirements that may justify restrictions on 
free movement. Crucially, however, the category of mandatory requirements is 
an open one. The CJEU is open to accept any reasonable public interest that 
a Member State may want to serve as a possible ground for justification. Later 
case law, for example, accepted grounds such as the protection of the envi-
ronment and of biological resources,52 consumer protection53 or freedom of 
expression54 as acceptable mandatory grounds.
The rule of reason, therefore, greatly expands the grounds a Member State 
may rely on to justify restrictions, thereby allowing for a better balancing of 
free movement and public interests. Some limits, however, do apply. Firstly, 
the CJEU does accept any purely economic grounds.55 Secondly, under the 
51   Cassis de Dijon, par, 8–9.
52   Joined Cases 3/76, 4/76 and 6/76, Kramer [1976] ECR 1279, Case 240/83, ADBHU, [1985] 
ECR 531, or Case C-443/10 Bonnarde ECLI:EU:C:2011:641.
53   Case C-353/89, Mediawet Nederland [1999], ECR I-4069, Case C-161/09, Kakavetsos-
Fragkopoulos ECLI:EU:C:2011:110, or Case C-481/12 UAB ECLI:EU:C:2014:11.
54   Case C-112/00, Schmidberger; Case C-71/02, Karner v Troostwijk ECLI:EU:C:2004:181.
55   See Case C-109/04 Kranemann [2005] ECR I-2421 or Case C-456/10, ANETT ECLI:EU: 
C:2012:241.
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orthodox approach, rule of reason grounds may only be used to justify restric-
tions that are indirectly discriminatory or non-discriminatory. Restrictions 
that are directly discriminatory may only be justified under a ground listed in 
Article 36 TFEU, although the CJEU does not always seem to follow this rule 
religiously.56
The main challenge for Member States in justifying an MEQR, however, usu-
ally is not to find an acceptable ground under Article 36 TFEU or the rule of 
reason, but to satisfy the proportionality test that comes next.
10.5.2 Proportionality of MEQRs
An MEQR is only justified if it is proportionate in relation to its aim. For inter-
nal market cases, the proportionality test asks two questions, relating to the 
suitability and the necessity of the MEQR. Crucially, both have to be assessed 
not in abstract but in relation to the specific aim or aims provided as the legiti-
mate aim.
The question of suitability essentially asks if a measure can actually achieve 
the objective it is supposed to serve. For instance, if the aim is to protect chil-
dren against too much sugar in soft-drinks, a measure imposing a maximum 
sugar content is suitable to achieve this aim, a measure just prohibiting French 
soft-drinks is not. The CJEU has further developed the suitability test by intro-
ducing the criterion of consistency, even if the CJEU does not always apply this 
criterion or does not apply it as stringently as it could. The central idea is that 
a measure can only be suitable if it achieves its objective in a consistent and 
systematic manner.57 This inter alia means that a measure should not under-
mine the very aim it is trying to achieve. An early application of this logic can 
be seen in Conegate, where the UK had seized a consignment consisting ‘essen-
tially of inflatable dolls which were clearly of a sexual nature’ as these violated 
public morality.58 At the same time, however, the UK did allow national pro-
duction and sale of similar inflatable devices, which led the CJEU to find that:
56   Case 113/80, Commission v Ireland ECLI:EU:C:1981:139 or Case 274/87, Commission v 
Germany [1989] ECR 229 for the orthodoxy. For apparent deviations see inter alia 
Case C-573/12, Ålands Vindkraft ECLI:EU:C:2014:2037 or Case C-389/96 Aher-Waggon 
ECLI:EU:C:1998:357.
57   See for the introduction of this test in the context of services Case C-243/01 Gambelli 
[2003] ECR I-13031.
58   Case 121/85, Conegate ECLI:EU:C:1986:114.
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a Member State may not rely on grounds of public morality within the 
meaning of Article 36 of the Treaty in order to prohibit the importation 
of certain goods on the grounds that they are indecent or obscene, where 
the same goods may be manufactured freely on its territory and marketed 
on its territory subject only to an absolute prohibition on their transmis-
sion by post, a restriction on their public display and, in certain regions, 
a system of licensing of premises for the sale of those goods to customers 
aged 18 and over.59
If it wants to, a court could impose far reaching scrutiny via a consistency test, 
as many political measures will not be wholly consistent, either internally or 
compared to other measures.60 In practice, however, the real scrutiny takes 
place in the context of necessity.
The necessity test asks if the same objective could not have been achieved 
with a less far reaching measure. In other words, is the MEQR the least restric-
tive measure that can be adopted to achive the public aim being pursued?61 In 
our example on the requirement to have less sugar in soft-drinks, for example, 
the question could be asked if the same objective could not be reached by bet-
ter labeling. Could a clear labeling requirement forcing producers to clearly 
indicate sugar content and calories perhaps achieve the same objective with-
out needing to impose a maximum sugar content?
It is at this stage that the CJEU can be extremely strict, truly requiring the 
Member States to show that there was no real alternative.62 At the same time, 
the application of the necessity test also gives the CJEU a certain flexibility. For 
example, in more morally or politically sensitive cases, it may apply a lighter 
touch and give some more leeway to the Member States, where in other cases it 
59   Idem, par. 20.
60   See further on this point A. Cuyvers, Case note to: Joined Cases C-338/04, C-359/04 and 
C-360/04, Massimiliano Placanica, Christian Palazzese and Angelo Sorricchio (Placanica) 
45 (2008) Common Market Law Review, 515.
61   See for example Case C-385/99, Müller-Fauré [2003] ECR I-4509, or Case C-161/09, 
Kakavetsos-Fragkopoulos ECLI:EU:C:2011:110.
62   Also note that the burden of proof at this stage is on the Member State, so it has to proof 
that the measure is suitable and necessary. Of course the CJEU can differenitate in how 
much evidence it requires, sometimes requiring actual statistical evidence, sometimes 
allowing more general claims about certain effects. See for example Case C-14/02, ATRAL 
SA [2003] ECR I-4431, or Case C-254/05, Commission v Belgium, [2007] ECR I-4269.
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may be very strict indeed.63 Predicting the precise application of the necessity 
test in a particular case therefore requires an analysis of the courts case law in 
the particular field involved, as well as looking at the general principles and 
rules for the free movement of goods.
As we will see in Chapters 11, 12 and 13, the other freedoms have all followed 
the general development of goods, meaning the creation of a wide prohibition, 
followed by the creation of additional ground for justification and a large body 
of case law on whether specific national measures may be justified or not.
63   Compare for example Case C-434/04, Anders Ahokainen [2006] ECR I-9171 and Case 
C-141/07, Commission v Germany, [2008] ECR I-6935 with Case C-297/05, Commission v the 
Netherlands, [2007] ECR I-7467, or Case C-110/05, Commission v Italy, ECLI:EU:C:2009:66.
